Abstract
In the manufacturing capacity sharing platform, considering the manufacturing capacity provider’s cost misreporting behavior and the collusion behavior of the platform operator, this paper built a supply chain consisting of a platform operator, a capacity provider with surplus capacity, and a manufacturer with insufficient capacity. This paper studied the influence of the cost misreporting behavior on the supply chain members’ decisions and profits. By use of the game theory, in the scenarios including the supplier misreporting to other supply chain members and the supplier colluding with the platform, the paper analyzed the optimal pricing decision, misreporting coefficient decision, and platform’s service fee decision and further compared the profits of the supply chain and its members. The results show that the capacity provider tends to overstate the production cost for gaining more profits, which exerts negative effects on profits of other members and the supply chain. Compared with the case of misreporting to both the manufacturer with insufficient capacity and the platform, the case of colluding with platform is more favorable to the profits of the manufacturer, the platform, and the supply chain, while the supplier prefers to choose the former situation. When the sales revenue-sharing proportion, cost-sharing proportion, and service fee satisfy certain conditions, the sales revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contract can avoid the capacity provider’s cost misreporting behavior and coordinate the supply chain.
Highlights
With the development of the Internet of ings (IoT), big data, cloud computing, and other technologies, sharing economy has attracted extensive attention. e manufacturing industry is undergoing a radical transformation driven by the IoT-related technologies and business innovation
An increasing number of intermediary manufacturing capacity sharing platforms have arisen to integrate fragmented manufacturing capacity from enterprises with surplus capacities in a sharable resource pool and provide manufacturing services to manufacturers or retailers with inadequate capacity, for example, omas platform in the United States, CASICloud platform, and Tao factory in China. e intermediary manufacturing capacity sharing platform offers an effective manufacturing solution to facilitate the match between capacity supply and demand, improving the utilization rate of capacities and expediting transaction processes
We focus on investigating the influence of manufacturing cost misreporting behavior of the capacity provider on the supply chain (SC) members’ decisions and profits and further strive to propose a contract to avoid the cost misreporting behavior and coordinate the SC
Summary
With the development of the Internet of ings (IoT), big data, cloud computing, and other technologies, sharing economy has attracted extensive attention. e manufacturing industry is undergoing a radical transformation driven by the IoT-related technologies and business innovation. Zeng et al [7] studied the cooperation of service providers based on capability sharing in the queuing system and proposed a costsharing mechanism that can encourage providers to reach cooperation based on the principles of fairness and easy implementation These studies investigate matching mechanisms, cost-sharing mechanisms, and cooperative game between manufacturers, their researches pay attention to the game problems between the supply and demand sides of the manufacturing capacity, without incorporating the decision-making process of platform operators and opportunistic behaviors of capacity providers. We try to analyze the influence of the misreporting behavior on decisions and profits of SC members and further design the contract to enable the capacity provider to report the real cost information and achieve SC coordination
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