Decision Making Processes in Counter-Terrorism Operations in Israel

Amnon Sofrin

doi:10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16

Abstract

Israel is fighting terrorism from its very early days. The terror acts are characterized by carrying out lethal attack on Israeli residents and/ or the abduction of civilians / soldiers in order to free Palestinians imprisoned in Israeli jail. During the years Israel's counterinsurgency doctrine was shaped based on two main cornerstones – Moshe Dayan’s doctrine of reprisal actions on terror attacks, formulated in the early 1950s, and the Rabin Doctrine on dealing with abducted Israelis. This article will analyze the processes of decision- making in Israel when fighting the two main forms of terror acts. After reviewing the main decision – making model a new decision- making model will be presented - the Two-Group Decision Making Model that will be demonstrated through analysis of four case studies: two cases of terror attack that Israel reacted by a military reprisal operation and two cases in which Israelis were abducted and the decision- makers had to choose to surrender to the terrorists demands or to launch a military rescue operation. The main conclusions of this article are that most of the decision- making process is made within a very small and intimate group headed by the leader and in most cases the Israeli decision – makers prefer to carry out a military operation on negotiations or any other course of action.

Highlights

This article will focus on the process of decision - making in a crisis situation, when the decision makers have to decide how to react within a short time, under a lot of pressure and usually, amid great ambiguity
The article will examine the alternatives explored by the decision makers, why a military operation is preferred and selected, who leads this course of action and what is the dynamics of the decision- making process
The four analyzed cases emphasize several important issues: The dominant role of the leader (Israel's Prime Minister) that designs his preferred course of action and gets the approval of both groups (DDG, Decision Approval Group (DAG))

Summary

Introduction

This article will focus on the process of decision - making in a crisis situation, when the decision makers have to decide how to react within a short time, under a lot of pressure and usually, amid great ambiguity. In this article I will analyze how the Two-Group Decision Making Model is implemented in decisions regarding a crisis scenario such as a mass terror attack on Israel or the abduction of Israeli civilians or soldiers. The other two cases deal with reprisal operations Operation "Father of Wisdom" (1978’s Operation Litani) was launched following a lethal terrorist attack on Israel's coastal road, and Operation "Defensive Shield" was launched in 2002 following a wave of deadly terror attacks in Israel, with one of the most horrific taking place on Passover Eve. The article will examine the alternatives explored by the decision makers, why a military operation is preferred and selected, who leads this course of action and what is the dynamics of the decision- making process Two will demonstrate the dilemmas facing decision makers in incidences of the abduction of Israelis, to surrender to the terrorists demands or to launch a military rescue operation: the abduction of Israeli passengers to Entebbe, Uganda in 1976, and the 1994 abduction of Corporal Nachshon Wachsman by Hamas terrorists to a secret location that was exposed by Israel.

Methods

Discussion

Conclusion