Decision making of optimal investment in information security for complementary enterprises based on game theory

Abstract

ABSTRACT With the development of information technology and the deepening of enterprise informatization, there are new challenges of enterprise information security investment decisions because of cooperative relationships among multi-enterprises. In this paper, the Gordon-Loeb model is extended to the multi-enterprise game environment, and combined with the probability of hacker invasion, which can stimulate enterprises to increase investment in information security and reduce costs, the game model of information security investment among complementary enterprises is constructed. Through this model, the impact of factors on optimal investment can be analyzed. It is found that the information security level of enterprises in cooperation situation is higher than that in the non-cooperation situation. Our research shows that the optimal investment will increase with the increase of the probability of one spread in cooperative situations, which is contrary to the changing trend of enterprises in non-cooperation situations, and there is a minimum expected cost threshold. According to the results, enterprise compensation mechanism and information sharing mechanism are designed to ensure the optimal level of social information security, it provides a new solution to deal with the information security investment decision of complementary enterprises under the characteristics of multi-enterprise and non-cooperative.