Decision-Making of Cross-Border E-Commerce Platform Supply Chains Considering Information Sharing and Free Shipping

Abstract

For cross-border e-commerce companies with high shipping costs, the existing retailer and the new entrant retailer on the platform are usually concerned with information sharing and free shipping due to the uncertainty of market demand. For this, by establishing a Stackelberg game model between two competing retailers, we analyze the strategy of retailers and explore the business strategies of the cross-border e-commerce platform. The study shows that regarding information-sharing strategies, retailer A’s willingness to share information is positively related to initial market potential and negatively related to market competition intensity. Moreover, retailer B is willing to spend higher information costs to purchase information when the necessity of the product is more elevated. As for a free shipping strategy, if the existing retailer offers free shipping, the new entrant retailer should also offer free shipping service to consumers when the initial market potential is larger. Conversely, when the initial market potential is smaller, the retailer’s willingness to offer free shipping decreases when the intensity of competition in the market increases. When the market tends to be perfectly competitive, the new entrant retailer will not choose a free shipping strategy, and the platform is most profitable when information sharing and free shipping occur simultaneously. However, when the carrier charges a higher shipping fee to customers, the existing retailer is more profitable when the new entrant does not offer free shipping. Therefore, in order to achieve a win-win situation for all parties, the platform needs to develop appropriate operational strategies to influence the decisions of retailers and carriers. Some numerical experiments are made to test the validity of the model and the effect of the parameters involved in the model.