Abstract
This study considers two government subsidy policies, namely, supply-side (subsidising elderly service companies) and demand-side (subsidising elderly customers) subsidies. A Nash game model consisting of elderly customers and two elderly service providers with different levels of infrastructure is developed to present the effects of government subsidies on the price, quality and quantity of demand for elderly services under different subsidy policies. The results show that the economic situation of the region and the strategic objectives of the local government are important factors influencing the effectiveness of the government’s subsidy strategy. For areas with good regional economic conditions, subsidies should be biased in favour of elderly care institutions with poorer infrastructure; for areas with poorer economic conditions, subsidies should be biased in favour of institutions with better infrastructure. Moreover, if the government plans to reduce prices more effectively, then it should adopt a demand-side subsidy policy for areas with a small or large elderly population and a supply-side subsidy policy for areas with a medium elderly population.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
