Decision-making mechanisms of greenwashing behaviors of building materials manufacturers: A media disclosure and consumer skepticism perspective

Abstract

While the commercial potential for green products has been recognized by consumers, media disclosure about manufacturers' greenwashing behaviors (GWBs) has raised suspicion among customers, particularly among building materials manufacturers (BMs). This study creates a supply chain structure for green building materials manufacturers (GBMs), greenwashing building materials manufacturers (GWBMs) and consumers using information asymmetry theory and the Stackelberg game technique. This study examines how media disclosure and customer skepticism affected the GBMs of building material manufacturers throughout two distinct periods. Specifically, it analyses two distinct periods: the first period focuses solely on the influence of media disclosure, while the second period takes into account both media disclosure and consumer skepticism. The primary results are as follows. (i) GBMs and GWBMs saw earnings fall as the risk of media disclosure of GWBs grew in the first and second periods. (ii) In the second period, as consumer skepticism rises, green manufacturers' earnings rise, but GWBMs' profits fall. (iii) The threshold for the degree of greenwashing increased over the two periods as the degree of media disclosure intensified. (iv) As their greenness increases, GWBMs' profits inverted U-shaped at both times. GBMs' profits exhibit an inverted U-shaped trend as their greenness increases in the first period and a continuing negative trend in the second period. The mechanism revealed in this study provides new ideas for the government to target building materials manufacturers' GWBs.