Decision-Making Mechanism and Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Seller's Remanufactured Price Deception Behavior

Abstract

In the early stage of the development of the remanufacturing industry, the confusion of market supervision and the influx of competitors in the same industry reduced the profits of remanufactured products. In order to obtain more profits, the seller conducted price deception of remanufactured products. This paper studies the evolution process of seller's remanufactured price deception behavior. Firstly, a three-party evolutionary game model consisting of the seller, governments and consumers is constructed. And the evolutionary stability of mixed strategies is analyzed by Lyapunov's first method matrix. The results show that: when the after-tax income of the seller who chooses not to disguise is greater than the difference between the after-tax income of disguise and the cost of disguise, the seller does not disguise and the consumer purchases. The market achieves an effective allocation at this time. Secondly, the internal evolutionary game model of the seller group is established. It is analyzed through the stability principle of differential equations. The results show that: the government increases incentives and punishments can both motivate the seller to choose not to disguise products.