Decision Making in the Hidden Judiciary: Institutions, Recruitment, and Responsiveness Among U.S. Administrative Law Judges

Abstract

This article examines the decisional motivations of state and federal administrative law judges. On the basis of the analysis of the survey responses of 265 state and federal administrative law judges (ALJs), we found that ALJs’ views toward the propriety of deferring to external stimuli (such as their agencies, public opinion, or to the elective branches of government) differ considerably in their exercise of quasijudicial authority. To determine the sources of this variation, two different conceptual models were tested, the first drawn from the “rational-actor” variation of the New Institutionalism school of decision making, and the second adapted from the “articulation model of judicial selection.” Although the rational actor model accounts for some portion of the variation observed, the alternative articulation model was superior in its predictive ability. These findings suggest that although institutional constraints are by no means irrelevant, the socialization process that ALJs undergo has an important impact on their feelings of responsiveness to a broad range of external actors. The authors discuss these findings in the broader normative context regarding judicial independence and bureaucratic responsiveness.