Abstract
Although the last decade has seen a large number of studies of the European Commission from institutionalist perspectives, a gap remains as far as the Directorates-General (DGs) are concerned. Institutionalist theories suggest that DGs may adopt a series of roles in response to the different tasks that they face, and sociological institutionalism emphasizes that this development is a significant source of their autonomy. This, in turn, warrants analyses derived from models that are designed to accommodate a considerable degree of complexity. The present article therefore analyses decision-making in the Directorate-General for Competition from a sociological institutionalist perspective, with a view to evaluating the added value in such analysis compared to more parsimonious approaches in the light of a single case study: the mid-1990s case of competition in the Elsinore ferry route between Denmark and Sweden.
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