Abstract
The environmental awareness of consumers and enterprises has gradually increased, and green production and green consumption have become the main theme of social economy. On the other hand, the complementary product market has become an important source of competitive advantage for enterprises. Considering a complementary product supply chain, and taking account of the consumers’ environmental awareness and the green subsidies provided by the government, this paper examines members’ decisions in relation to four contract models based on game theory. By solving the model, it is shown that the government’s green subsidy plan improves the green degree of subsidized products and complementary products. Furthermore, compared to wholesale price contracts, revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contracts motivate manufacturers to improve the greenness of subsidized products, and they achieve a Pareto improvement for the whole supply chain and its members, when the contract parameters are appropriate. Numerical experiments also reveal that both the greenness of the complementary products and the profit for members increase with the green innovation spillover effect as a result of the complementary products and the scale of green consumers with environmental awareness in the market. This study provides good guidance for decision-making concerning the complementary product supply chain, and further contributes to environmental protection.
Highlights
Assuming that consumers with environmental awareness are more sensitive to the green degree of complementary products than the price of complementary products, the green manufacturing spillover effect of complementary products is greater than the cross-price elasticity coefficient (β > α)
The expression of the optimal green decisions in proposition 1 implies that the optimal greenness of the products relates to the cross-price elasticity of the complementary products, the green spillover effect, and the green manufacturing input coefficients of the products, and is influenced by the unit green subsidy coefficient of the government
Attention.,due due to the spillover effect of green innovation, complementary products inevitably play an to the spillover effect of green innovation, complementary products inevitably play an important role in the development of the green economy
Summary
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. We investigate the contractual parameter settings among supply chain members and the coordinated optimization of the supply chain To address these questions, we consider a complementary product supply chain, including a complementary product supplier, a common retailer, and consumers with environmental awareness, and present four classes of two-period dynamic models based on different contracts, including a wholesale price, subsidy sharing, cost sharing and revenue sharing, taking account of government green subsidies. We consider a complementary product supply chain, including a complementary product supplier, a common retailer, and consumers with environmental awareness, and present four classes of two-period dynamic models based on different contracts, including a wholesale price, subsidy sharing, cost sharing and revenue sharing, taking account of government green subsidies By solving these problems, we obtain the equilibrium price and green decisions under different contracts and the conditions with which the contract improves the profit of members and the supply chain. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature and explains our contributions in more detail; Section 3 outlines the key elements of our model, as well as the derivation of consumer purchase behavior; Section 4 describes the model framework, presents the optimal equilibrium solutions in different cooperation contracts, and reports our main findings; Section 5 investigates the comparison of the different contracts and the effect of factors using numerical experiments; and Section 6 summarizes our conclusions and suggests opportunities for future research
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