Abstract

Due to the profitability and selfishness of crowdfunding system users, under fixed budget conditions, there are problems, such as low task completion rate due to insufficient participants and low data quality. However, the existing incentive mechanisms are mainly based on traditional economics, which believes that whether users participate in tasks depends on whether the benefits of the task outweigh the costs. Behavioral economics shows that people judge the value of gains and losses according to a reference point. The weight given to losses is more important than the weight given to the same gains. Therefore, this article considers the impact of reference dependency and loss aversion on user decision-making and proposes a participant selection mechanism based on reference dependency (PSM-RD) and a quality assurance mechanism based on loss aversion (QAM-LA). PSM-RD uses reference points to influence user pricing and selects more participants based on relative value. QAM-LA pays additional rewards based on the data quality of participants and motivates them to improve data quality by reconstructing utility functions. The simulation results show that compared with the ABSee mechanism, data quality has improved by 17%, and the value of completed tasks has increased by at least 40%.

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