Deciding on the Tit for the Tat: Decision-Making in the Wake of Ceasefire Violations

Abstract

ABSTRACT Ceasefires are agreed in most intra-state conflicts and the majority of these agreements are violated. Yet, the subsequent dynamics of retaliation are still poorly understood. This article proposes a novel conceptual framework, describing the decision-making of conflict parties after ceasefire violations. I argue that the conflict parties face the two-fold decision-making problem of choosing a proportionate reaction: a reaction that assures their interest in the ongoing conflict and in the continuation of the agreement. When proportionate reactions are chosen, mutual compliance with the ceasefire can be re-established. The empirical implications of this framework are illustrated with evidence from two ceasefires in the Mindanao conflict in the Philippines. This article advances our analytical understanding of an overlooked period during armed conflict, i.e. while a ceasefire is in place. This is critical since collapsing ceasefires can lead to a deterioration of the humanitarian situation and of the prospects for peace. More generally, this article draws the attention to the counter-intuitive function of violence to secure cooperation in intra-state conflicts.