Deciding for Others: An Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment

Abstract

AbstractThis paper develops a new form of metaethical expressivism according to which the normative judgment that X should Φ consists in a decision that X Φ. When the judgment is first‐personal—e.g., my judgment that I should Φ—the view is similar to Gibbard’s plan expressivism, though the state I call “decision” differs somewhat from a Gibbard‐style plan. The deep difference between the views shows in the account of third‐personal judgments. Gibbard construes the judgment that Mary should Φ as a de se plan on the thinker’s part to Φ if she turns out to be Mary (the Subtle View). I construe the judgment as a decision for Mary that Mary Φ (the Simple View). The main argument for Simple Plan Expressivism is that it solves problems for Gibbard’s approach, resonates with a new and interesting moral psychology, and better makes sense of certain independently plausible constraints on normative judgment. In the end I argue that this account of normative judgment has implications for first‐order ethics, implying in particular that rational egoism as standardly formulated is incoherent.