Deception Attacks on Remote Estimation with Disclosure and Disruption Resources

Abstract

The problem of deception attacks utilizing both disclosure and disruption resources in the multiple types of sensors setting against remote state estimation is investigated in this paper. A group of sensors, including reliable and unreliable ones, measure system states and transmit innovations to a remote fusion center via wireless channels, wherein a malicious attacker can modify the data packets of unreliable sensors. By virtue of disclosure resources of reliable sensors and disruption resources of unreliable ones, a stealthy linear attack strategy is given, which can deceive the anomaly detectors and degrade the estimation performance. We obtain feasible criteria under which such attack policies can bypass existing detectors. The evolution of estimation error covariance at the remote end under the attacks is analyzed. Then, a closed-form expression of the optimal linear deception attack maximizing estimation error covariance is derived. Moreover, extended results on the designed attack strategies and attackers with extra measurements are provided. Finally, two illustrative examples with stable and unstable processes are given to verify the effectiveness of proposed methods.