Abstract
ABSTRACT For a nation composed of independent regions, the effects of local tax competition for business investments are examined. It is first shown that atomistic regional authorities tax only local resources to finance the provision of public services to business. Thus, an efficient interregional equilibrium is induced. Various political/institutional constraints are shown to cause misallocation of the capital stock and an inefficient provision of public services. The characterization of the inefficiency is shown to vary widely, depending upon the constraint under consideration.
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