Abstract

With the rise of technology in recent years, more people are studying distributed system architecture, such as the e-government system. The advantage of this architecture is that when a single point of failure occurs, it does not cause the system to be invaded by other attackers, making the entire system more secure. On the other hand, inner product encryption (IPE) provides fine-grained access control, and can be used as a fundamental tool to construct other cryptographic primitives. Lots of studies for IPE have been proposed recently. The first and only existing decentralized IPE was proposed by Michalevsky and Joye in 2018. However, some restrictions in their scheme may make it impractical. First, the ciphertext size is linear to the length of the corresponding attribute vector; second, the number of authorities should be the same as the length of predicate vector. To cope with the aforementioned issues, we design the first decentralized IPE with constant-size ciphertext. The security of our scheme is proven under the ℓ-DBDHE assumption in the random oracle model. Compared with Michalevsky and Joye’s work, ours achieves better efficiency in ciphertext length and encryption/decryption cost.

Highlights

  • Identity-based encryption (IBE) was first introduced by Shamir [1] in 1985, which allows a sender to use the recipient’s identity to encrypt a message

  • The first IBE scheme was proposed by Boneh and Franklin [2] in 2001

  • We propose a novel DIPE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts, and we give a formal security proof for the selective IND-CPA security under q-DBDHE

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Summary

Introduction

Identity-based encryption (IBE) was first introduced by Shamir [1] in 1985, which allows a sender to use the recipient’s identity to encrypt a message. Since k can be viewed as a part of the security parameter, which is a constant, the ciphertext size is linear to the length of attribute/predicate vector Another problem is that, in their scheme, each authority is responsible for issuing a private key for only an element in the user’s predicate vector. In their scheme, each authority is responsible for issuing a private key for only an element in the user’s predicate vector Since each authority issues a partial private key for one element in a predicate vector, the number of authorities must equal to the length of predicate vector, which may not be practical, i.e., in the scheme of [25], an authority cannot responsible for multiple attributes, which is common in practice

Contribution
Organization
Notation
Bilinear Maps and Complexity Assumption
System Model
Definition of DIPE
Security Model
The Proposed Scheme
Security Proof
Comparison
Asymptotic Comparisons
Experimental Result
Conclusions
Full Text
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