Decentralized control of electric vehicles in a network of fast charging stations

Abstract

To facilitate the adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) and their plug-in hybrid (PHEVs) counterparts and to avoid straining the capacity of the power grid there is a strong need for developing a network of fast charging facilities and coordinate their service. Incorporation of EVs in the vehicle fleet would decrease green house gas emissions and overall dependency on fossil fuels. A key issue in charging EVs is that the corresponding time is fairly large, which can lead to very long delays. Hence, for the network of charging stations to provide good quality of service to customers, we first propose an admission control mechanism based on pricing for a single charging station. Subsequently, we develop a decentralized routing scheme of EV drivers, employing a game theoretic model. The latter entices drivers through price incentives to require charging from less busy stations, thus leading to a more efficient utilization of power across the network, while it enhances profit for the charging facilities operator. Of note, the proposed scheme does not require advanced monitoring tools for power usage and pricing calculations. The drivers receive and send back the necessary information through the a communications infrastructure and the routing is initiated only when the network has exceeded a critical threshold. The numerical results illustrate the discussed benefits of the proposed scheme.