Decentralization of Control in U.S. Nuclear Energy Policy

Abstract

When President Dwight Eisenhower launched Atoms for Peace in 1953, he declared that the atom stands ready to become man's obedient, tireless servant, if man will only allow it.' Three decades later, a credible source ranked civilian U.S. nuclear power program as the largest managerial disaster in business history.2 The failure of American nuclear power to deliver economical and socially accepted energy has found various explanations. David Collingridge stresses inflexible quality of nuclear technology itself, such as long lead times, high capital intensity, and large unit size, which rendered political control over nuclear development impossible.3 James Morone and Edward Woodhouse argue that at a critical decision-making juncture in mid-1960s dramatic scale-up of reactor sizes and shift in safety strategy from containment to prevention of accidents conjured up public debate over safety, which then undermined viability of nuclear power.4 In a similar historical vein, James Jasper emphasizes that mindset of technological enthusiasm prevailed too long among nuclear power's industrial and political promoters, thus blocking