Decade of Transition: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Origins of the American-Israeli Alliance (review)

Abstract

Book Reviews ..:. 131 author to even consider this line ofargumentation-seemingly only because it is a core component of"conventional" Zionist historiography-'---'diminishes the contribution this otherwise promising book might make to the reader's understanding ofcontemporary Israeli society. David H. Goldberg, Ph.D. Foundation for Middle East Studies Toronto Decade of Transition: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Origins of the AmericanIsraeli Alliance, by Abraham Ben-Zvi. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. 219 pp. $47.50. Relations between the United States and Israel have always been complex, at times puzzling. Superficially there has been strong support even at the risk of undermining American interests in the Arab world. A more sophisticated understanding is that the quality and intensity ofsupport have varied over the years. Even though at a basic level Israel has long known that it has the backing of the United States, experience has demonstrated that such a stance cannot be taken for granted and that indeed U.S. and Israeli interests, though moving generally in the same direction, do not necessarily coincide and may even diverge significantly on specific issues. The lack of predse convergence on the shape ofa peace settlement with the Palestinians is a good example. The result ofthis process has been numerous periods oftension in the relationship, even when a basically friendly president sat in the White House. Among these periods are 1947--48 when PresidentTruman faced a hostile national security and foreign policy establishment, 1956-57 when President Eisenhower coerced Israel to withdraw from Sinai, 1974-75 when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger threatened to reassess the bilateral relationship during the redeployment negotiations, 1982-83 when President Reagan was furious at Israel during the Lebanon War, and 1991-92 when President Bush used the loan guarantees as a means of extracting Israeli concessions in the context of the peace process. Of all of these, probably the most difficult period was during the Eisenhower administration, when the president and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles displayed open hostility and issued bald threats to a recalcitrant Israel. Consequently that period has come to represent the nadir of U.S.-Israel relations. It is within the context of that history that Abraham Ben-Zvi has undertaken to clarify just what did happen during Eisenhower's two terms. He demonstrates that the reality ofthose eight years was much more complicated than is commonly understood and that indeed the groundwork for the more sympathetic policies ofthe Kennedy years was laid during the second term. Despite the change in party control and high-level personnel, Ben-Zvi contends that there was continuity from one administration to the next and that the decision to sell Hawk missiles to Israel in 1962 was the culmination 132 SHOFAR Fa1l2000 Vol. 19, No. I of policy development that had been underway for some years. Implicit in this contention is the notion that U.S. policy makers during the later Eisenhower years had begun to realize that their country had a strategic interest in a strong and secure Israel, indeed that Israel, contrary to the earlier conventional wisdom about antagonizing the Arab states, could even advance American interests in the region in a manner that was relevant to the larger context of the Cold War. Ben-Zvi describes the 1957-61 period as one ofincubation, during which the seeds ofa closer relationship were sown despite the confrontation over the Sinai withdrawal. During that term and the subsequent abbreviated Kennedy term, policy makers' attitudes were affected primarily by the strategic regional environment, especially the developing triangular connection between the SovietUnion, Egypt, and Syria. Although some observers had contended that Kennedy, a Democrat, was more sensitive to domestic political considerations (i.e., Jewish votes) than the Republican Eisenhower, Ben-Zvi is convinced that any emerging pro-Israel tendency during thatperiodreflected national interest calculations rather than any concern about the special relationship between the two countries. Even though Ben-Zvi makes a strong case for the significance ofstrategic concerns at that early date, Israel's strategic significance for the U.S. has been a subject of considerable debate ever since. In fact, the advent of a new administration always seems to require that the case be made once...