Debt Crises, IMF Policies and Structural Inequality in the Third World

Abstract

The neo-liberal policies of liberalization and deregulation, as utilized by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its dealings with countries of the developing world, tend to facilitate the conditions for financial crisis. This can be traced by examining the economic crises of Mexico in 1982 and 1994/95, Asia in 1997 and Russia in 1998 and looking at the main causes and triggers of these crises. It is evident that the financial vulnerability that these countries suffered from existed due to, and not in spite of, these policy prescriptions. The IMF continues to present these policies as proven successes - a view that this dissertation contests. Further to this, the policies that the Fund uses are formulated for use in semi-peripheral economies and have little relationship to the actual economic environments of peripheral countries such as those of sub-Saharan Africa or Papua New Guinea. The ideology of free-markets and globalization is seen as unassailable by the IMF. By encouraging countries to remain part of the global financial system through debt rescheduling and open-markets policies, the IMF holds an increasingly fragile economic environment together. This dissertation formulates and tests four hypotheses in relation to Mexico, Asia, Russia and Papua New Guinea and the periphery. These are - (1) If there are periods of 'irrational exuberance' among investors in Third World debt, these are likely to contribute to debt crises. (2) If IMF policies are implemented in the Third World as dictated, then their primary benefits will accrue to the elites in those countries and in the developed world. (3) If Third World countries open their economies to foreign capital, then they are more likely to experience debt crises. (4) If IMF policies are implemented in peripheral countries, then they are even less likely to be successful than in semi-peripheral countries.