Abstract
5. Summary This lecture has been an attack on Bayesianism, which I see as a meta-physical doctrine that hinders advances in the foundations of game theory. The lecture began with an appeal to the authority of Savage. It continued with an attempt to explain how it can be shown that certain universes of discourse cannot be completable in the sense required to legitimize a Bayesianismist methodology. It concluded with a brief discussion of some of the implications of looking seriously at the idea that decision-making should be described in terms of algorithms.
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