Debating the Unipolar Moment

Abstract

In his article, Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War, Michael Mastanduno explores the ramifications of realist theory in effort to refute critics who challenge the enduring relevance of the realist paradigm.' Specifically, he seeks to assess whether realism can serve as a useful guide to U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War. His prose is lucid and his methodology is impressive, as he adroitly draws out the observable implications of balance-of-power and balance-of-threat theory for post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy. Based on his examination of U.S. foreign policy since 1989, Mastanduno concludes that realism can indeed provide useful insights, with balance-of-threat theory offering the most plausible explanation of U.S. policy and balance-of-power theory providing the most credible explanation for U.S. policy. Balance-of-threat theory is said to explain an effort to preserve America's position at the top of the international hierarchy by engaging and reassuring other major powers, and balance-of-power theory is said to account for an effort to mobilize for national competition against other major powers (p. 51). But do we really need two different theories to explain U.S. foreign policy? Mastanduno claims that the United States is trying to play economic hardball and security softball at the same time (p. 52), and that this presents a contradiction that can be resolved only by recourse to two separate theories. Granted, the issue areas are different, but neither balance-of-threat nor balance-of-power theory limits its domain to a single issue area. Surely the best way to resolve this seeming contradiction is to find one theory that explains both issue areas. Fortunately, such a theory is available. Although Mastanduno has invited its two sister theories to the ball, he has overlooked a third, more deserving member of the realist research family. This stepsister of balance-of-power and balance-of-threat theory, neglected and often belittled by its realist relations, is hegemonic stability theory. It is to this theory that the glass slipper properly belongs, because both U.S. and strategies fit the expectations of hegemonic stability theory more comfortably than they do other realist theories. Hegemonic stability theorists argue that international politics is characterized by a succession of hegemonies in which a single powerful state dominates the system as a result of its victory in the last hegemonic war.2 The