Abstract
In this article, the author seeks to contextualize the argument, made by Thomas Schultz, that we should re-examine the autonomy claim in view of Lon Fuller's standards of procedural justice. When discussing the possibility and desirability of arbitral legal orders being autonomous, we should do the following: first, open up the engagement with Lon Fuller to political theory of law and integrate the Legal Realists and the Critical Legal Studies scholars, as well as the neo-formalist/neo-functionalist critique of activist judges; second, place Fuller's principles of procedural justice within democratic theory of law and bring into the discussion Fuller's tensions with Dworkin; and, third, engage with the debate on the legitimacy deficit of the emerging transnational legal order. Eventually, it is the entire discussion of Global Administrative Law that should be connected to analyses of arbitral orders as instances of procedural justice.
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