Abstract
Comparative thanatologists study the responses to the dead and the dying in nonhuman animals. Despite the wide variety of thanatological behaviours that have been documented in several different species, comparative thanatologists assume that the concept of death (CoD) is very difficult to acquire and will be a rare cognitive feat once we move past the human species. In this paper, we argue that this assumption is based on two forms of anthropocentrism: (1) an intellectual anthropocentrism, which leads to an over-intellectualisation of the CoD, and (2) an emotional anthropocentrism, which yields an excessive focus on grief as a reaction to death. Contrary to what these two forms of anthropocentrism suggest, we argue that the CoD requires relatively little cognitive complexity and that it can emerge independently from mourning behaviour. Moreover, if we turn towards the natural world, we can see that the minimal cognitive requirements for a CoD are in fact met by many nonhuman species and there are multiple learning pathways and opportunities for animals in the wild to develop a CoD. This allows us to conclude that the CoD will be relatively easy to acquire and, so, we can expect it to be fairly common in nature.
Highlights
Comparative thanatologists attempt to uncover the proximate mechanisms involved in the responses to the dead and the dying across animal1 species, as well as the ultimate functions behind these mechanisms
Comparative thanatologists tend to agree on the idea that the concept of death is an unusual cognitive feat once we move beyond the human species
We have argued against the assumption, common amongst comparative thanatologists, that a concept of death (CoD) is difficult to acquire and very rare once we move past the human species
Summary
Comparative thanatologists attempt to uncover the proximate mechanisms involved in the responses to the dead and the dying across animal species, as well as the ultimate functions behind these mechanisms This area of study is filled with difficulties, given that ethical constraints make the use of experiments tricky (Gonçalves and Biro 2018; Monsó 2019), and so scientists must rely more than usual on opportunistic observations gathered in the wild. 2, we will show that this presupposition stems from two forms of anthropocentrism that underlie scientists’ reflections on death: (1) an intellectual anthropocentrism, which leads to excessively demanding accounts of the CoD, and (2) an emotional anthropocentrism, which yields an unwarranted focus on grief as a reaction to death Contrary to what these two forms of anthropocentrism suggest, we will argue that the CoD requires relatively little cognitive complexity and that it can emerge independently of mourning behaviour. We will examine the cognitive requirements of the CoD and show how, coupling this analysis with biological and ecological considerations, we can predict that the CoD is relatively easy to acquire and much more prevalent in nature than is usually presupposed
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