Abstract

AbstractRecent scholarship analyzes norm dynamics in the US context using the prohibition on assassination contained in Executive Order 12333 as the relevant norm. These studies argue that—before 9/11—the ban on assassination was largely uncontested and effectively constrained US foreign policy. In doing so, these studies overlook the impact of the Reagan administration on the evolution of the ban. This article establishes that the Reagan administration engaged in a concerted, and largely successful, effort to undermine the ban. The article relies on scholarship on norm contestation and norm robustness. The analysis identifies key features of the ban as a norm, including its ambiguity and executive character. It highlights the role and power of a cluster of US officials led by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Casey. Crucially, the analysis traces the prominence of dynamics of contestation of the ban in the context of unconventional warfare and counterterrorism. In line with existing scholarship, the analysis finds cases of validity contestation, meaning contestation, and applicatory contestation. Contrary to existing scholarship, however, the analysis stresses the radical nature of actors’ attempts to shrink the remit of the ban through applicatory contestation. This contestation was often made superfluous by the blurring—through meaning contestation—of the expectations set by the norm. A historically grounded analysis of contestation during the Reagan years provides a better understanding of how US officials (re)shaped the ban, establishing precedents for the legal, political, and discursive conventions surrounding assassination deployed after 9/11.

Highlights

  • Drone strikes and targeted killings are institutionalized and normalized elements of contemporary US counterterrorism policy and practice, renewing debates regarding the legality of targeted killings and whether they amount to assassination (Schmitt 1992; Melzer 2008; Alston 2011)

  • Setting the Record Straight: Archives and Assassination in the Reagan Years Focusing on the US ban on assassination as the relevant norm, this article follows other scholars in “transferring” insights developed for international norm and norm contestation to a domestic level of analysis (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Banka and Quinn 2018, 669)

  • Contesting the meaning of the norm by reshaping the concept at the center of the norm, Clarridge added that the killing of these officials was political, but it did not violate the ban on assassination since a killing only amounted to assassination if it targeted a head of state (Dickey 1987, 257); something that contradicted the Church Committee’s understanding

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Summary

Introduction

Drone strikes and targeted killings are institutionalized and normalized elements of contemporary US counterterrorism policy and practice, renewing debates regarding the legality of targeted killings and whether they amount to assassination (Schmitt 1992; Melzer 2008; Alston 2011). The analysis stresses the radical nature of actors’ attempts to shrink the remit of the ban through applicatory contestation. A historically grounded analysis of contestation during the Reagan years provides a better understanding of how US officials (re)shaped the ban, establishing precedents for the legal, political, and discursive conventions surrounding assassination deployed after 9/11.

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