Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between compensation, investment strategies and performance in private equity. Some funds adopt deal-by-deal carried interest models. Under these rules, bonus payments to General Partners are a function of each deal within the fund. These are paid only when positive deal returns are realized, resembling a portfolio of call options. I show that deal-by-deal compensation induces greater heterogeneity in portfolio investments. Funds select firms with increased diversification across specific risk factors. Net performance is negatively affected by higher fee payments. This paper uses a new dataset that includes fee and investor cash flow data.
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