Abstract

This slim volume reviews relations between India and Pakistan from 1999 to 2009. The narrative of events is well and clearly described, as is the profusion of violent incidents from the Kargil War of 1999 through to the assault on the Indian parliament in 2001, the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 and the two bombings of the Indian Embassy in Kabul in 2008 and 2009. In fact it is surprising that, in spite of such circumstances, so much dialogue took place, including the ‘Composite Dialogue’ which so nearly ended in success in 2008. Sumit Ganguly is at his best when examining how India chose to react to all these atrocities. Both Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh were conscious of the dangers of provoking a nuclear-armed nation which had a declared ‘first use’ policy. They also found it hard to be sure what was the work of terrorist groups acting alone and which attacks might have been sponsored by Pakistan. The attempted military mobilization in 2002 showed India how poorly prepared it was to make a quick retaliatory strike. Some Indian defence experts argued the case for a conventional war under a nuclear umbrella (p. 47), but were unable to demonstrate that it would be possible. Little wonder, therefore, that both prime ministers returned to engagement with Pakistan. In 2016, Prime Minister Modi has been wrestling with the same issues after the attacks on Pathankot and Uri, but with some new ideas intended to show Pakistan that there could be penalties (perhaps in Balochistan or relating to Indus waters) from asymmetric tactics.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call