Deadly consequences: lessons from the evolution of terrorist attacks against United States diplomats

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article sheds light on the complex relationship between adaptive terrorist behaviours and U.S. diplomacy by investigating the interplay between diplomatic security reform and terrorist target selection. A longitudinal study (1970–2019) of 555 terrorist attacks against U.S. diplomats suggests that terrorists targeted U.S. diplomats between 1970 and 1998 because they were perceived as soft, yet symbolic, targets. In response to increasing attacks on diplomats, the U.S. began improving diplomatic security, but an inability to grasp how terrorists operate caused this process to be inefficient and flawed. Terrorists, in turn, exploited these security conditions for decades until, after the deadliest series of coordinated attacks against U.S. diplomats occurred in 1998, security improved to a level where diplomats were no longer a viable target. The findings underscore the critical role of security enhancements and lessons learned in deterring terrorists, emphasising the need for effective intelligence systems and policies. The analysis therefore has numerous implications for understanding how we can learn from our inaction and demonstrates how we should use our understanding of terrorist rationality to predict tomorrow’s terrorist threats.