Abstract

Abstract The legal framework of the International Criminal Court does not contain any provision concerning animals. This stands in contrast with the frequency with which they appear in both trial and reparations proceedings. The silence of the legal framework is problematic insofar as the ‘animal turn movement’, which questions the classical understanding and treatment of animals as objects, has permeated into both the international and domestic legal spheres. This article wishes to initiate a discussion on the treatment of animals before the Court by examining whether they could qualify as victims under Rule 85(a) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. While the short answer to this question is an unequivocal ‘no’, the conclusion reached is not the purpose of the analysis. The analysis shows that animals cannot qualify as ‘victims’ because they are not human beings. Yet, they comfortably meet the other two criteria, namely, (a) suffering harm, which (b) results from the commission of crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction. Thus, this article argues that — at least — granting animals the same treatment as human beings is no more objectionable as a matter of legal principle than granting them the status of ‘things’. This calls for a prompt discussion of the regulation of animals within the Court.

Highlights

  • The short answer to the question posed by this article — whether animals can qualify as victims before the International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) — is a Journal of International Criminal Justice (2021), 1 of 28 doi:10.1093/jicj/mqab[039] ß The Author(s) (2021)

  • The analysis shows that animals cannot qualify as ‘victims’ because they are not human beings

  • The Appeals Chamber has explained that natural persons in the sense of Rule 85(a) Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) includes: ‘direct’ victims, that is, those whose harm results from the commission of the crime; and ‘indirect’ victims,[30] who suffered harm as a result of that endured by the direct victims, such as family members or those who suffered harm helping or intervening on behalf of victims to try and prevent the commission of the crime.[31]

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Summary

Introduction

The short answer to the question posed by this article — whether animals can qualify as victims before the International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) — is a. The way animals are treated has become a matter of public morality with legal implications.[1] In contrast, the ICC legal framework continues to reduce animals to things, thereby concealing their particular vulnerability to core crimes and rendering their suffering invisible and legally irrelevant. This is a problem not least because of the Court’s truth-telling function and role in counteracting those atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.

The Status quo of Animals before the Court
The Relevance of Qualifying as a Victim
What is a Natural Person?
The Choice of the International Criminal Court
The Second Requirement
Can Animals Suffer Physical Harm?
Can Animals Suffer Moral Harm?
Can Animals Suffer Material Harm?
Can Animals Suffer Fundamental Deprivation of Rights?
Third Requirement
War Crimes
Harm Arising to Animals from War Crimes Against Property
Harm Caused to Animals by War Crimes Against Specially Protected Objects
Harm Caused to Animals by War Crimes Involving Unlawful Methods of Warfare
Harm Caused to Animals by War Crimes Against Human Persons
Crimes Against Humanity
Harm Caused to Animals through Persecution
Genocide
The Crime of Aggression
Extrinsic Impediments to the Recognition of Animals as Victims
Findings
Conclusion
Full Text
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