DE EXCLUSIVITEIT VAN ARISTOTELES' ETHIEK VERSUS ZIJN NATUURFILOSOFIE: EEN METHODOLOGISCHE BENADERING

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Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Summary The exposition starts from the exclusivity of aristotelian ethics, according to which on biological grounds but for socio-ethical reasons, children, women and slaves have no full share in human happiness. The article shows that implicitly, the aristotelian ethics are even more exclusive. Also, it argues that in his exclusive, naturalistic ethics Aristotle puts a heavy strain on the principles of his natural philosophy: the building up of his ethics on the basis of his natural philosophy leads to inconsistencies. Therefore, section II indicates and describes the most important cognitive values in Aristotle's philosophy of nature, viz. a value-charged and optimistic teleology, empiricism, (restrained) indeterminism, finitism and consensus-orientation. Section III outlines the naturalistic basis of the ethics in order to make clear that Aristotle indeed conceives ethics in a naturalistic manner. Section IV shows that the exclusion of women, children and slaves or barbarians is inconsistent with the restrained indeterminism and with the empirical arguments for the teleology. It is argued that Aristotle could have avoided those inconsistencies by giving more radical biological arguments for the exclusiveness, viz. by making women and slaves a separate biological species (which could, eventually, be incorporated in the exceptional heterotelic sketch of Pol. 1256b15 ff.). Although in fact no longer consistent, the naturalistic ethics do accord with the values of his audience. The following section demonstrates that, as a consequence of Aristotle's recognition of a history of culture (polis, technai) and especially of philosophy, his finitism and his fundamental empiricism are also denied in the ethics. There are strong indications that, in Aristotle's opinion, not only a good polis does not (yet) exist, but that there is no perfect philosophy either. In fact Aristotle's theories do not match his own values. This implies that no human being, not even Aristotle, has ever realized the ethical ideal, sc. the theoria. Consequently, the good human life cannot be approached empirically as the good life of the other animals can be. Man constitutes a biological anomaly because in contrast with all other animals he has not yet realized his telos. This double conclusion is exclusively based on premisses from the Corpus, in which it remains implicit because it contradicts the assumptions of the audience and because it is less optimistic about Aristotle's own achievements. In short, the main conclusion is that the most important cognitive values of the biological works are abandoned when man is involved. In other words, the relation between philosophy of nature and ethics in Aristotle is less solid than at first sight might be expected.