Abstract
What does it mean to say that an agent has a reason to do a certain action? Does it mean that she would desire to do the action, or that there is some external consideration, which she ought to follow? Or is there a third alternative? The debate between Humean affective (i.e., desire-based) and classical Kantian cognitive theories has seemingly ended up in a theoretical standoff, and so most of the contributors have recently focused on the conative attitude of motivation - either preceded by affective or cognitive attitudes. Accordingly, they contend that an agent has a reason to f only if, on some occasions, she would be motivated to f: call this Conative Reason Internalism. I argue, first, that even the most qualified version of this weak conative condition obtains only contingently. Secondly, that a cognitive contextual attitude, derived from the agent’s capacity of Reasons-Understanding, necessarily obtains. Therefore, necessarily, if an agent has a reason to f, it follows that, were she contextually rational, she would make evaluative sense out of the propositional content of f-ing or would understand why f-ing is considered as a right action in the relevant context: I call this De Dicto Cognitive Reason Contextualism.
Highlights
Ever since Williams (1979) qualified a Humean affective Theory of Reason and cast doubt on the plausibility of the classical externalist account of practical reasoning, highlighting instead the explanatory dimension required for every reason for action, most practical reasoning theorists have been convinced that a kind of conative attitude, viz. motivation, necessarily obtains in the definition of normative reason
This necessary condition is widely supposed to be a weak counterfactual conative attitude, and any affective Humean theory would be compatible with this condition only in a non-substantive sense (Schroeder 2007)
It seems that the vulnerability of different versions of conative internalism originates from a basic supposition about the agent’s capacity to be motivated by reasons, which itself seems only contingently true of the concept of an agent
Summary
Ever since Williams (1979) qualified a Humean affective (i.e., desire-based) Theory of Reason and cast doubt on the plausibility of the classical externalist account of practical reasoning, highlighting instead the explanatory dimension required for every reason for action, most practical reasoning theorists (see, for instance, Korsgaard 1986; Smith 1994; Velleman 2000; Joyce 2001; Darwall 1983; McDowell 1995; Brandt 1979; Nagel 1970; A) have been convinced that a kind of conative attitude, viz. motivation, necessarily obtains in the definition of normative reason. Motivation, necessarily obtains in the definition of normative reason This necessary condition is widely supposed to be a weak counterfactual conative attitude (i.e., counterfactual motivation), and any affective Humean theory would be compatible with this condition only in a non-substantive sense (Schroeder 2007). I aim to establish an alternative theory of normative reason on the basis of the agent’s cognitive attitudes (i.e., neither the affective nor the conative attitudes) It seems that the vulnerability of different versions of conative internalism originates from a basic supposition about the agent’s capacity to be motivated by reasons (which I call the capacity of Beingmotivated-by-reasons), which itself seems only contingently true of the concept of an agent.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
