Abstract

This paper argues that demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) trajectories of non-state armed groups are shaped by a group’s internal organization. Extensive research by political scientists has demonstrated a correlation between internal features of armed groups and their behaviour (e.g. extent of violence used against local communities). I extend this analysis to DDR outcomes by illustrating how two features of an armed group’s internal organization – command profile and financing architecture – influence post-conflict DDR trajectories. To substantiate the theory, four case studies from Colombia, Nepal and Libya are reviewed. The article concludes with the limitations and opportunities of this approach, including the potential of predicting DDR challenges.

Highlights

  • In 1989, the UN Security Council mandated the first disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme following Namibia’s decade long civil war (Dzinesa 2004)

  • This article argues that the internal organization of non-state armed groups have a critical, if underappreciated, influence on the outcome of disarmament and reintegration (DDR) trajectories

  • Cross-cutting these two features I proposed a typology by categorizing non-state armed groups into four ideal types

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Summary

Introduction

In 1989, the UN Security Council mandated the first disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme following Namibia’s decade long civil war (Dzinesa 2004). Recent research has identified specific features or proxies to determine a group’s command profile, including the extent to which a group’s code of conduct is formalized, and the nature of its induction process (Bangerter 2013; McQuinn 2012a) Both authors of this research hypothesized that in order to indoctrinate new members into a formalized command structure, the process would, like in a state army, require months of structured and repetitive political and military training. This indoctrination process establishes the codes of conduct and the broader doctrine underpinning the ideological and rule-following practices of the group. Financing Architecture Financial resources are critical to building and sustaining the fighting capacity of any military organization (Keegan 2004).

Indoctrination process Intense ‘rites of terror’
Operational concentration
Revenue concentration Concentrated Diffuse û û
Findings
Conclusion
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