Abstract
According to Michael Smith, normative realists cannot explain why people act on their normative judgments as reliably as they do, so we should embrace constructivism (or perhaps constitutivism) instead. Normative realists have countered by insisting that they can establish (1) that rationality typically requires people to act on their normative judgments and (2) that people typically are rational. I acknowledge that normative realists can establish (1) but argue that (2) poses problems both for non-naturalists and for reductive naturalists. I close by suggesting that Davidson’s non-reductive (or “anomalous”) form of naturalism may give normative realists a better chance of success.
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