Abstract

The former Soviet military bastion, Russia’s westernmost region, the Kaliningrad Oblast, has again re-gained its military strength. The process of re-militarization that was initiated after 2009, resulted in transformation of the area into Russia’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) zone. In the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis (started in the late 2013) and growing alienation between Moscow and its Western partners, the oblast has stepped onto a qualitatively new level of militarization. At the same time, following changing nature of warfare, aside from military-related steps, the Russian side has heavily invested in non-military aspects as well. The analysis yields three policy implications. First, Russia’s understanding of the A2/AD concept is different from the Western reading, and Kaliningrad exemplifies this supposition. Second, Russia will continue using Kaliningrad as a part of its growing reliance on asymmetricity. Third, underestimation of Russia’s resolve and/or Kaliningrad capabilities will have largely negative conclusions for the Baltic Sea region and countries that comprise it.

Highlights

  • Following the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in late 2013, the Kaliningrad Oblast, Russia’s westernmost region, which is physically detached from the mainland, has for the second time in its post-1945 history been transformed into Russia’s militarised outpost in Europe

  • Russia’s non-linear strategy, comprised of integrated use of military and non-military actions employed during the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent debacle in the Ukrainian southeast, has alarmed Western policymakers, intellectuals and analysist, who logically ask about other potential areas where Russia might want to strike

  • Kaliningrad Oblast is frequently viewed as the most natural springboard from which a decisive thrust could be launched

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Summary

Sergey Sukhankin

The former Soviet military bastion, Russia’s westernmost region, the Kaliningrad Oblast, has again re-gained its military strength. The process of re-militarization that was initiated after 2009, resulted in transformation of the area into Russia’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) zone. In the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis (started in the late 2013) and growing alienation between Moscow and its Western partners, the oblast has stepped onto a qualitatively new level of militarization. At the same time, following changing nature of warfare, aside from military-related steps, the Russian side has heavily invested in non-military aspects as well. Russia will continue using Kaliningrad as a part of its growing reliance on asymmetricity. Underestimation of Russia’s resolve and/or Kaliningrad capabilities will have largely negative conclusions for the Baltic Sea region and countries that comprise it

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