Dasein, authenticity, and choice in Heidegger’s "Being and time"

Abstract

Martin Heidegger’s account of how Dasein becomes authentic appears fraught with contradictions. On the one hand, Heidegger claims that Dasein’s authenticity is the inevitable result of the state of mind of anxiety, i.e., anxiety is both the necessary and sufficient condition of authenticity. On the other hand, he seems to suggest that Dasein’s authenticity involves a choice. I propose an interpretation which views Dasein’s authenticity as a two­‑step process, thereby reconciling the apparent contradiction, by making a distinction between Dasein’s becoming authentic and Dasein’s continuing to be authentic. The former is the initial grasp by Dasein of the primordial truth of its existence and is the inevitable result of anxiety. The latter is the willful and repeated affirmation by Dasein of that initial insight and as such requires a choice. I also distinguish between two kinds of inauthenticity: first, the inauthenticity of everyday Dasein; and second, the inauthenticity of Dasein that willingly refuses to acknowledge its existential truth. The latter is interpreted as a choice – either a willful choice or a choice by default. Finally, I suggest that Heidegger’s call to authenticity may be interpreted as a call, not for a normative ethics, but for an ontological ethics.