Dasein – (не)человеческое в человеке?

Abstract

The author analyzes the problem of the “Dasein” – “human” (“Mensch”) relation in Heidegger’s philosophy in the context of his criticism by the contemporary British philosopher Dylan Trigg. Trigg characterizes Heidegger’s thought and its conceptualization of the human being as being-in-the-world as the best example of the total failure of classic phenomenology to think outside of humanity and to bring to light the unassimilated depth of the unhuman basis of humans. Trigg takes into account the urgent claims of speculative realism to get out of correlationism as an inseparable correlation between the subject and the world and he intends to renew the stalled phenomenological tradition through the reading of lesser known works, which contain a trace of the unhuman. Criticizing the philosophy of Heidegger for anthropocentrism, Trigg contrasts it with his project of “another”, “unhuman phenomenology”. However, the British philosopher, opening a new type of phenomenology, keeps silent about the problem of the “Dasein” – “human” relation in Heidegger’s thought and about the question of reasonableness of the immediate reduction of Dasein to the human entity. Is Heidegger’s philosophy really grounded in the centrality of the human subject and therefore represents “anthropocentric phenomenology” or, on the contrary, does it originally overcome any kind of humanism and anthropocentrism? The author of this article analyzes Heidegger’s text – from the early lectures and works of the period of “Being and Time” to the late seminars and lectures after the “Turn” – and tries to solve the Dasein – human problem in the context of Trigg’s concept of the unhuman.