Abstract
When the Baltic States regained their independence in 1991, Denmark had been one of their very strongest supporters, at a time when many European countries looked at the Baltic aspirations with caution. It was one of the first examples of the new post-Cold War “activist” Danish foreign policy strategy. It was not, however, without difficulties. Thus, the article argues that the Danish Social Democratic centre-left and Conservative-Liberal centre-right disagreed on how to support the Balts in practice and at what price. The difference was rooted in a hawk-dove disagreement over detente and the Soviet Union. Government party colour, the article argues, is therefore likely to have been crucial for the Danish policy. Had the relatively hawkish centre-right government not been in power, it is very doubtful that we would have seen the kind of aggressive diplomatic support for Baltic independence as we saw from Denmark leading up to 1991.
Highlights
When the Baltic States regained their independence in 1991, Denmark had been one of their very strongest supporters, at a time when many European countries looked at the Baltic aspirations with caution
When the Baltic countries fought their way to independence in 1991, three factors in particular made it possible: the implosion of the Soviet Union, US support for the Baltic cause and, most of all, an energetic local drive for independence in each of the Baltic countries
One can speak of two phases of disagreement: When Baltic independence movements began to stir in 1988, it was initially the Social Democrats who were in the forefront arguing for Danish involvement, while the centre-right government insisted on restraint and on the continuation of the policy of strict non-recognition and isolation of local Baltic authorities
Summary
Understanding small state support for the Baltic cause could mean analysing either Icelandic or Danish Baltic policies. Danish support for the independence of the Baltic countries from 1989 has often been regarded as a prime example of consensus about the new Danish activism in those crucial years when the Cold War was coming to an end The main hypothesis of this article is that the initially sparse Danish consensus about Danish activism and Baltic policies can be explained by analysing the divide that separated the way the centre-right government and the Social Democratic opposition reasoned about foreign policy along hawk-dove lines. Answering these questions is important from a Danish perspective to understanding the roots of Danish foreign policy activism It is important from a Baltic perspective to understanding what really motivated a key Western country to support the Baltic cause during the crucial years leading to independence. It is important for a broader audience interested in how differences in foreign policy preferences along a hawkdove divide influence how different parties and politicians perceive foreign policy challenges
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