Danish Defense Transformation and the Technopolitics of Relevant Military Contributions

Anders Theis Bollmann

doi:10.31374/sjms.60

Abstract

This article shows how the transformation of the Danish Defence, initiated with the defense agreement of 2004, was impacted by socio-technological change. The article takes as its theoretical starting point the concepts of security and military imaginaries and the study of (military) technopolitics. It argues that the Danish military transformation was a product of the Danish foreign policy ambition of being viewed as a trustworthy and relevant ally – especially by the United States. This ambition meant that Denmark had to make relevant military contributions to the period’s U.S.- and NATO-led international operations. Therefore, the perception of what constituted relevant military contributions came to shape the Danish military transformation. In this process the period’s large-scale socio-technological changes, fueled by unprecedented information and communication technological development, played a central role in (re-)shaping both U.S. and Danish security and military imaginaries. This through technopolitical narratives of the information age, (the dark sides of) globalization, and the Revolution in Military Affairs which (in)directly impacted the broader Danish understanding and concrete practice (i.e. policy) in regard to military transformation in connection with the 2004 defense agreement. Finally, for Denmark, the technopolitical conflicts emerging around the schism of having to transform in order to be viewed as a trustworthy ally capable of making relevant military contributions and the large-scale economic and organizational investments required by the transformation led Denmark to formulate its own technopolitical strategy or narrative. This in the shape of Network-Based Operations framed as a specific Danish pragmatic and down-to-earth approach to transformation.

Highlights

The changed security environment emerging in the post-Cold War period meant that the small Scandinavian state of Denmark had to recalibrate its foreign, security, and defense policies (Jakobsen & Rynning 2019)
They were reluctant to introduce and/or could not afford large-scale investments in Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) technologies such as C4ISRTA systems and Precision Guided Munitions (PGM). These Cold War structures and operational concepts meant that European militaries were not geared for expeditionary warfare (Adams et al 2004: 3; Osinga 2010: 29f; Farrell & Rynning 2010). This led to an increasing gap in military capabilities and technology between Europeans and the United States referred to as the ‘capabilities gap’ or ‘technology gap’ and later as the “Transformation or network-centric gap” (Bialos & Koehl 2005: 10)
Bloody, protracted insurgencies, the technopolitical narrative(s) of the RMA vision, Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), and Transformation had permeated the thinking of European states and their general perception of what comprised a modern military and, in continuation hereof, relevant military contributions (Demchack 2003: 307)

Summary

Introduction

The changed security environment emerging in the post-Cold War period meant that the small Scandinavian state of Denmark had to recalibrate its foreign, security, and defense policies (Jakobsen & Rynning 2019). These Cold War structures and operational concepts meant that European militaries were not geared for expeditionary warfare (Adams et al 2004: 3; Osinga 2010: 29f; Farrell & Rynning 2010) This led to an increasing gap in military capabilities and technology between Europeans and the United States referred to as the ‘capabilities gap’ or ‘technology gap’ and later as the “Transformation or network-centric gap” (Bialos & Koehl 2005: 10). Bloody, protracted insurgencies, the technopolitical narrative(s) of the RMA vision, NCW, and Transformation had permeated the thinking of European states and their general perception of what comprised a modern military and, in continuation hereof, relevant military contributions (Demchack 2003: 307) This can, for instance, be seen in the processes of Transformation in Britain and France as well as in other European states (Farrell, Rynning & Terriff 2013; Osinga 2010). Both recommended that the territorial defense structure was to be dismantled and instead the Danish Defence was to be structured around two dimensions: the so-called total defense that was to be a pendant to the U.S Homeland Security, focusing on preventing and reacting to both natural and manmade disasters,

Danish

Conclusion