Dangerous collusion: corruption as a collective venture in contemporary China

Abstract

Echoing changing social environments, corruption has grown in sophistication and complexity. This paper focuses on the phenomenon of collective corruption. Collective corruption, a distinctive form of social interaction among people dominated by individual calculations and unorganized interests, takes place when collaboration becomes a powerful, necessary weapon in pursuing private gains. The danger of collusion in corrupt ventures is that as corruption gets well planned and skillfully coordinated in its collective form, it may become less forthright and therefore more difficult to detect, or more overt and increasingly legitimized as an appropriate form of economic intercourse. The term corruption tends to carry with it an image of secrecy and furtiveness that entails the involvement of the least possible number of individuals. Corruption, on the whole, is a clandestine exchange due to its illegal nature. Corruption takes place, for example, when a financial officer embezzles public funds for personal use, a school principal arranges “back-door” admissions for his relatives or friends, or a government official accepts bribes from his subordinates in exchange for favourable treatment. These practices are either conducted by a single person who seeks to enrich him/herself in an individualized manner or occur between two parties where a patron (usually an official) grants his/her client (whoever is willing and able to pay for it) desired preferential treatment in exchange for goods or services. Corruption, in reality, is more complex than its heuristically useful definition. Echoing changing social environments, corruption grows in sophistication and complexity in terms of causes, forms and characteristics. This paper studies the phenomenon of “collective corruption”, a concept derived from the author’s research in China where recent corruption cases show an alarming tendency for party and government officials to collude with each other, as well as with people outside the government, on a massively corrupt scale. The following are just a few examples of this kind of “dangerous collusion”: • In Hebei province, a collective embezzlement case involved at least seven high-ranking government officials, including the province’s executive deputy governor, bureau chief of transportation, director of the taxation department, and the party secretary of a major city. 1 1 Hebei Ribao, 21 November, 2000. • A startling bribery case concerning the Minjiang Engineering Bureau of Fujian Province implicated 70% of its bureau-level officials, including the two most senior ones—the bureau director and the party chief. 2 2 Datequ Dangfeng (The Party Discipline in Special Economic Zones), 7 June, 1997. • More than twenty bureau and departmental chiefs were involved in a case of land leasing fraud. Each of them accepted bribes of at least hundreds of thousands RMB. 3 3 People’s Daily, 1 November, 2000. The exchange rate between US dollars and Chinese RMB is approximately $1=8 yuan. • When a major corruption case of the East China Aviation Management Bureau was disclosed, seven section directors and one deputy bureau chief were found involved. 4 4 Baokan Wenzhai (Shanghai), 10 September, 1998. • More than a dozen officials at the Public Security Bureau in Qinghai Province were found guilty of corruption, including the bureau chief, deputy chief, deputy director of the province’s legal affairs office, and deputy general manager of a company affiliated with the bureau. 5 5 Zhongguo Jiancha (Supervision in China), July 2000, p. 32. These cases, and many more like them, testify to the fact that corruption in many instances takes the form of a collective undertaking. Why do people act collectively rather than singly in what is supposedly a secret exchange? How do they come to transcend or bypass institutional and legal boundaries in their collusion? To what extent does the collectivization of corruption alter the forms and characteristics of corruption, if not its very nature? What impact does collective corruption have on the overall efforts to curb corruption? This article tries to provide answers to these questions. It treats collective corruption as a distinctive form of social interaction among people dominated by individual calculations and a pursuit of personal interests. It extends the analysis of collective behavior to corruption and argues that an aggregation of individual pursuits of self-interest can yield similar claims and behavior patterns. Collective corruption serves as a good case to study how unorganized interests generate collective behavior and how collaboration becomes a powerful weapon in seeking private gains. This article opens with a definition of collective corruption. It then discusses the socio-economic and psychological roots of collective corruption and offers interpretative remarks on how and why collective corruption rapidly spreads in China. In so doing, it portrays the characteristics of collective corruption as a distinctive form of collective behavior. The findings of this article illustrate how corruption is evolving as its actors, forms, and characteristics actively respond to social and economic changes, especially under the construct of a hybrid of state socialism and capitalism in today’s China.