Danger

Abstract

At first glance, philosophy of might seem to be an unproblematic discipline. However, closer inspection reveals that philosophers and religious people often seem uneasy when confronted with subject. That uneasiness, one suspects, is due to fact that philosophy of poses a threat to our accepted notions of philosophy and religion-a threat that lies in ambiguity of genitive. The philosopher suspects that philosophy of is religious philosophy, a disguised and apologetics that threatens objectivity of philosophy. The religious person, on other hand, suspects that philosophy of is philosophy about religion, an intrusion into by outsiders (i.e., unbelievers) that threatens sanctity of religious belief and practice. In following, I want to explore threat posed by philosophy of and argue that should embrace ambiguity of genitive and danger that poses to philosophy and religion. Indeed, as philosophers of have no choice but to embrace this ambiguity if are to be true to philosophy, religion, and philosophy of religion. The danger of philosophy of is acknowledged in one of two ways. One way involves a kind of repression and avoidance of threat. Thus on opening page of his An Introduction to Philosophy of Religion (2nd edition, Oxford, 1993) Brian Davies tells us that it is difficult to say exactly what philosophy of is, noting that difficulty lies in characterizing both philosophy and religion. Rather than pursuing this insight, he goes on to tell us that he will attempt perilous of defining philosophy of religion (ix) and then proceeds to introduce us to subject. Here Davies, like a few other philosophers of religion, is dealing with problem and threat posed by philosophy of by not dealing with it. However, avoidance and repression generally are not healthy ways of coping with problems; they lead to more problems. Thus William Wainwright, for instance, also foregoes any definition, though he has some very definite ideas about what philosophy of should be covering. He seems to assume that philosophy of is equivalent to (whatever that is) and consequently jumps right into an argument about maximally perfect reality,1 despite fact that there are religious traditions (e.g., Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism) that cannot be said to be doing theology (i.e., investigating logic ofGod) or are not concerned with a maximally perfect reality. If philosophers of such as Davies and Wainwright refuse to define what is they are doing, they leave themselves open to suspicion that they have a hidden agenda, or have made assumptions that will not survive light of day. Of course, more often than not philosophers of do undertake the perilous task of defining philosophy of religion. Yet they too acknowledge threat posed by philosophy of (albeit indirectly) by characterizing in such a way as to put everyone at ease. A good example can be found at beginning of John Hick's popular introduction to Philosophy of Religion (4th edition, Prentice-Hall, 1990). On opening page of that work, Hick confidently proclaims-with emphasis-that we may reserve name `philosophy of religion' for what (by analogy with philosophy of science, philosophy of art, etc.) is its proper meaning, namely, philosophical thinking about religion (1). The definitionsenerally accepted and/or echoed in other treatments of subject2-is bound to be comforting to both philosophers and religious persons. But definition (and those like it) does not do justice to philosophy, religion, or philosophy of religion, either in theory or in practice. One of first things to note about Hick's definition is that somehow places philosophy outside religion. …