Cyprus, 1955–1959: The US, Britain and the USSR: Then is Now

Abstract

ABSTRACT Using recently released documents, this paper considers the viewpoints of Britain, the US and the USSR vis-à-vis Cyprus in the crucial years between 1955 and 1959. Having explained the author’s historical and mental underpinning, the paper shows how crude Cold War geopolitical considerations dictated the approach of all three countries, whatever the moral arguments. The documents revealed in the article show that the British colluded secretly with Turkey, and were fully aware that the Turkish Cypriot leadership had planted a bomb at the Turkish consulate, in order to instigate anti-Greek rioting—a fact covered up at the time, and only recently proven by the eventual release of British documents. The paper demonstrates unequivocally how the whole 1959 arrangement was predicated on the Anglo-Saxons’ insistence on a NATO solution, and how critical the USSR was about an arrangement that was clearly dysfunctional. The paper concludes that external tensions, fear of Russia, and a continuing attempt to solve a problem by repeating the same errors still hold true today.