Abstract

Today, power systems have transformed considerably and taken a new shape of geographically distributed systems from the locally centralized systems thereby leading to a new infrastructure in the framework of networked control cyber-physical system (CPS). Among the different important operations to be performed for smooth generation, transmission, and distribution of power, maintaining the scheduled frequency, against any perturbations, is an important one. The load frequency control (LFC) operation actually governs this frequency regulation activity after the primary control. Due to CPS nature, the LFC operation is vulnerable to attacks, both from physical and cyber standpoints. The cyber-attack strategies ranges from a variety of attacks such as jamming the network communication, time-delay attack, and false data injection. Motivated by these perspectives, this paper studies the cybersecurity issues of the power systems during the LFC operation, and a survey is conducted on the security analysis of LFC. Various cyber-attack strategies, their mathematical models, and vulnerability assessments are performed to understand the possible threats and sources causing failure of frequency regulation. The LFC operation of two-area power systems is considered as a tutorial example to quantify the vulnerabilities. Mitigation strategies through control theoretic approaches are then reviewed and highlighted for LFC operation under cyber-attack.

Highlights

  • Today, the power sector is one of the critical infrastructures in the industrial control system because generation, transmission, and distribution of power are governed by automation

  • Due to large interconnections and remotely located generation, load, and control terminals, the power systems can be categorized as a cyber-physical systems where sensing, communication, and computing technologies are applied to physical spaces [1,2]

  • Denial of Service (DoS) activity in system is incorporated by modeling the system into a switched system and switched system control theory is applied to strengthen the resilience in load frequency control (LFC) operation, for example, state feedback controller [29], sliding mode control [30], etc

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Summary

Introduction

The power sector is one of the critical infrastructures in the industrial control system because generation, transmission, and distribution of power are governed by automation. LFC is always considered a benchmark problem in control theory as electrical grids are monitored by SCADA and controlled by industrial control systems [18,19,20,21] This secondary frequency control operation (after the primary control by droop of the generator) is responsible for maintaining the frequency within scheduled range around (50/60 Hz depending upon the geographical region) and power flow on tie lines to agreed value. The workstation was hacked and the power supply got interrupted, and the communication network between customer and provider were blocked This incident opened the eyes of the control researchers to look for some resilient control mechanism incorporating the cyber-physical approach to secure the power operation

Mathematical Description of LFC Operation
Replay attack
Covert Attack
Resonance attack
Attack through Load
Simulation Study
Attack Detection and Prevention
Limited Access in the Control Center
DoS Prevention
False Data Injection Prevention
Time Delay Mitigation
Hardware Validation
Conclusions and Future Work
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