Abstract

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are often defended in the same manner as information technology (IT) systems -- by using perimeter security. Multiple factors make such defenses insufficient for CPS. Resiliency shows potential in overcoming these shortfalls. Techniques for achieving resilience exist; however, methods and theory for evaluating resilience in CPS are lacking. We argue that such methods and theory should assist stakeholders in deciding where and how to apply design patterns for resilience. Such a problem potentially involves tradeoffs between different objectives and criteria, and such decisions need to be driven by traceable, defensible, repeatable engineering evidence. Multi-criteria resiliency problems require a system-oriented approach that evaluates systems in the presence of threats as well as potential design solutions once vulnerabilities have been identified. We present a systems-oriented view of cyber-physical security, termed Mission Aware, that is based on a holistic understanding of mission goals, system dynamics, and risk.

Highlights

  • Cyberphysical systems require resiliency techniques for defense, and multicriteria resiliency problems need an approach that evaluates systems for current threats and potential design solutions

  • We present a systems-oriented view of cyberphysical security, termed Mission Aware, that is based on a holistic understanding of mission goals, system dynamics, and risk

  • Mission Aware supports decision making through the use of three fundamental concepts: 1) Cyberphysical systems (CPSs) modeling based on systems theory and top-down hazard analysis, 2) automated vulnerability assessment via mining of attack databases, and 3) reusable design patterns, many of which exist in the literature and some of which have been developed by the authors

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Summary

COVER FEATURE GOVERNMENTS AND TECHNOLOGY

Cyberphysical systems require resiliency techniques for defense, and multicriteria resiliency problems need an approach that evaluates systems for current threats and potential design solutions. We argue that such methods and theory should assist stakeholders in deciding where and how to apply design patterns for resilience Such a problem potentially involves tradeoffs between different objectives and criteria, and these decisions need. Multicriteria resiliency problems require a systems-oriented approach that evaluates systems in the presence of threats as well as potential design solutions once vulnerabilities have been identified. Mission Aware supports decision making through the use of three fundamental concepts: 1) CPS modeling based on systems theory and top-down hazard analysis, 2) automated vulnerability assessment via mining of attack databases, and 3) reusable design patterns, many of which exist in the literature and some of which have been developed by the authors. To explain and demonstrate these concepts, we develop an example based on an application to an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) performing a tactical reconnaissance mission

MANAGING COMPLEXITY THROUGH ABSTRACTION
SYSTEMS AND GRAPH THEORY FOR SAFETY AND SECURITY
Unacceptable Mission and System
Threat modeling
Inertial Measurement Unit
DESIGN PATTERNS FOR RESILIENCE
EVALUATING RISK AND TRADEOFFS
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