Abstract

ABSTRACTAt the forefront of the academic scrutiny of cyberspace within the jus ad bellum context is the extent to which cyber operations fall within the paradigm of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. A related question is whether or not the injury suffered by a state subjected to a cyber-attack would be sufficient to invoke its inherent right of self-defence. This article considers the natural technological trajectory of self-defence in cyber operations by examining the very real possibility that computer networks eventually may be enabled to seek to defend themselves automatically against more aggressive cyber intrusions (‘automated cyber self-defence’). This possibility necessitates an examination of the way and extent to which such actions would fall within the existing jus ad bellum framework regulating a defensive response. More controversially, the article will also assert that the temporal parameters of self-defence in response to a cyber-attack may need re-calibration: issues of detection (particularly against dormant malware) and attribution may prevent a state from responding in a more conventional timeframe.

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