Abstract
The demand for carbon neutrality leads to the transition from traditional synchronous generator-based power systems to power electronics-enabled power systems. The controllability and observability of power electronics devices are achieved by underlying metering and communication infrastructures, which are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. This review comprehensively investigates the cyber resilience of power electronics-enabled power systems from three aspects, i.e., before, during, and after cyber-attack events. Specifically, the cyber resilience of multiple power electronics devices in power generation (photovoltaic and wind), power transmission (high-voltage direct-current), power prosumption (electric vehicle, smart building, microgrid), power storage, and grid-tied converters, are addressed, respectively. In addition, this review thoroughly investigates the representative cyber-attack events, cyber-defense threats, cybersecurity regulations, and graphical cyber–physical architectures of the power electronics-enabled power system. As a result, this review proposes a general cybersecurity paradigm of power electronics closed-loop controllers. Therein, the cyber timescale, stealthiness, and threat between power electronics closed-loop controllers and power grid open-loop applications are investigated, respectively.
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