“Cutting Up a Chicken with a Cow-Cleaver”—Confucianism as a Religion in Japan’s Courts of Law

Ernils Larsson

doi:10.3390/rel13030247

Abstract

This paper explores the Naha Confucius Temple case, resolved by the Supreme Court in February 2021, in light of postwar decisions on Articles 20 and 89 of the Japanese constitution. Religion is a contested category in Japanese legislation, appearing both in the constitution and in laws regulating the freedoms and restrictions of legally registered religious organizations. While the organization behind the Confucius Temple in Naha was registered as a general corporate juridical person, the majority opinion sided with the plaintiffs’ argument that the free lease granted to the temple by the municipality of Naha constituted a violence of the ban on public sponsorship of religious institutions and activities. In order to reach their decision, the Supreme Court and the lower courts not only had to decide on whether Confucianism was a religion or not, but also on whether the organization behind the temple—a group dedicated to the history and memory of the Chinese immigrant community in Naha—should in fact be considered a religious organization. The outcome of the case is a good example of religion-making in courts of law, with a central institution of power employing notions of sui generis religion to regulate and define civil actors.

Highlights

In a ruling on the Naha Confucius Temple case1 which was handed down by the Japanese Supreme Court on 24 February 2021, the justices behind the majority ruling concluded that by allowing a religious institution to stand on public land without paying rent, the mayor of Naha in Okinawa had violated the principle of secularism in the 1947 constitution
According to the findings presented in the Naha District Court ruling on the case, Kume sōsei-kai 久米崇聖会 (KSK) has the goal to spread “Eastern culture”, which should be understood as “the spiritual culture found in the teachings of Confucius and centered upon the realization of ‘rén, yì, lı, zhı, and xìn’”28
(kitō 祈祷) on the temple grounds 43. By emphasizing these religious elements in the form of Confucianism expressed by KSK at the facilities in Matsuyama Park, the plaintiff argued that KSK should be considered a “religious organization” despite its legal status:

Summary

Introduction

Fourteen of the justices signed off on the grand bench ruling, one justice, the former diplomat and ambassador to the United Kingdom, Hayashi Kei’ichi, filed a dissenting opinion Basing his argument on the extensive cultural influence of Chinese Confucianism in the Ryukyu Kingdom since the 14th century and noting the rather vague connections to “religiousness” (shūkyōsei 宗教性) present in the activities carried out at the Naha Confucius Temple, he suggested that to consider “this a violation of the principle of secularism must be described as ‘cutting up a chicken with a cow-cleaver’ [gyūtō o motte niwatori o saku 牛刀をもって鶏を割く]”.2. Japan’s courts of law, but it should be emphasized from the outset that the concept itself has never been conclusively defined This is not a problem that is unique to Japan. The Supreme Court to establish that under Japanese law, Confucianism should be considered a religion

Religion as a Legal Category in Japan

Religion-Making in Japan’s Courts of Law

13. See also

The Naha Confucius Temple Case

Conclusions

Chapter 3