Abstract
Part 1 Foundations of public choice theory: foundational concerns - a criticism of public choice theory, James M. Buchanan welfare economics and two approaches to rights, Amartya K. Sen. Part 2 Scope amd method of public choice theory: widening public choice, Vani K. Borooah co-operation and fairness in experiments - relevance for democracy, Bruno S. Frey and Iris Bohnet culture and efficiency - economic effects of religion, nationalism and ideology, Ulrich Blum and Leonard Dudley, Part 3 Constitutional economics: the constitution-making process, Jon Elster does ethical proceduralism underlie James M. Buchanan's constitutional contractualism?, Jose Casa Pardo and Jesus Conill Sancho institutional design and the homo economicus, Peter Lewisch. Part 4 Public choice and game theory: development of game theory and of public choice - an interaction, Francesco Forte. Part 5 Rent-seeking: legal rent-seeking, Gordon Tullock congressional influence over decision-making at the ITC. Part 6 Constitutional economics and the European Union: the design of a minimal European federal union - some ideas using the public choice approach, Friedrich Schneider. Part 7 Public Choice and Public Finance: the socialization of commodities - a revisionist view, Geoffrey Brennan. Part 8 Theory of societal evolution: moral norms and rationality within populations - an evolutionary theory, Ulrich Witt.
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