Culture, theory-of-mind, and morality: How independent and interdependent minds make moral judgments

Abstract

Although the investigation of the neural mechanisms of morality has increased in recent years, the neural underpinnings of cultural variations in judgments of morality is understudied. In this paper, we propose that the well-established cultural differences in two cognitive processes, consideration of mental state and causal attribution, would lead to differences in moral judgment. Specifically, North Americans rely heavily on the mental state of a protagonist and dispositional attributions, whereas East Asians focus more on situational attributions and place less emphasis on the mental state of a protagonist. These differences would be accounted for by activity in brain regions implicated in thinking about others’ minds, or theory-of-mind (ToM), which would underlie the cultural shaping of moral judgment. This proposed cultural neuroscience approach may broaden the scope of morality research, better predict moral behavior, and reduce disparities in diverse groups’ moral judgment.