Culture and high reliability organizations: The case of the nuclear submarine

Abstract

Perrow defined as ‘high risk’ those organizations that combine complexity and tight coupling with the potential for catastrophic failure. He concluded that accidents are ‘normal’ for such organizations because their managers face irreconcilable structural paradoxes. Centralization, the method of dealing with the tight coupling, must be combined with delegation, the method of dealing with the complexity. Weick, researching the complex and tightly coupled systems found in air traffic control and carrier flight-deck operations, saw these problems differently. He argued that strong organizational cultures provide a centralized and focused cognitive system within which delegated and loosely coupled systems can function effectively. High risk organizations thereby become transformed into high reliability organizations (HROs). Drawing on their personal experiences, the paper's authors focus on one type of HRO, the nuclear submarine. We argue for a multi-level model in which culture interacts with and supports formal structure and thereby produces high reliability. In effective organizations culture and formality co-exist. The nuclear submarine service is also the intersection of several different cultures. Rickover created a new culture for the nuclear Navy which is clearly a crucial source of reliability, but it is also in tension with the older naval and submarine traditions.