Cultural Heritage, Genocide, and Normative Agency

Rasa Davidavičiūtė

doi:10.1111/japp.12473

Abstract

AbstractIn this article, I explore the possibility of treating cultural destruction and the destruction of cultural heritage as a genocidal act. My argument proceeds in two stages. I first suggest that we ought to view cultural destruction as a necessary by‐product of genocide and a member of a set of jointly sufficient conditions for genocide. However, to securely establish that cultural destruction and the destruction of cultural heritage ought to be viewed as genocidal acts, we need to additionally show why loss of culture and heritage are significant harms, comparable to other instances of genocide. In light of this, I then propose an account of the harms of cultural destruction that grounds these harms in loss of normative agency and show how destruction of cultural heritage contributes to this. In particular, I argue that cultural heritage can be viewed both as a condition for normative agency and as itself an expression of normative agency.

Highlights

In this article, I explore the possibility of treating cultural destruction and the destruction of cultural heritage as a genocidal act
Unclear to what extent genocide and cultural destruction are conceptually coextensive. What would justify such a connection and to what degree is one properly part of the other? If cultural destruction is a genocidal act, is it a necessary condition for genocide, a sufficient condition, or both? In light of these questions, my aim in this article is to explore the conceptual space for treating cultural-heritage destruction as a genocidal act, by both interrogating the concept of genocide itself and by inquiring into the explicit moral harms involved in cultural-heritage destruction qua genocide
What I hope to have shown in this article is that there is conceptual space for treating cultural destruction as a genocidal act

Summary

Genocide and Cultural Destruction

There is widespread consensus that the definitive feature of genocide is its group orientation. Many countries were absent that the Egyptian delegation tried to have the vote postponed.[15] did the negotiations over the contents of the Convention seem to be fraught with political considerations, the vote did not seem to reflect an overwhelming consensus to begin with What this indicates is that the exclusion of an explicit cultural provision in the Genocide Convention was to a significant extent motivated by pragmatic concerns of signatory states, rather than deep conceptual tensions that would signify that cultural destruction is inconsistent with other aspects of genocide. If the group were able to morally improve its ways by changing its social vitality by eradicating the particular evil cultural practices in question, following Card’s reasoning, destroying said group, all other things being equal, would no longer qualify as nongenocidal

Cultural Destruction as a Condition for Genocide

Cultural Heritage and Normative Agency

Conclusion